


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
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" The Institutions of Our Federal Government" Canada's System of Government

Mutt Strawman



By the **Constitution Act, 1867**, "the executive government of and over Canada is declared to continue and be vested in the Queen." She acts, ordinarily through the **Governor General**, whom she appoints, on the advice of the Canadian prime minister. The Governor General normally holds office for five years, though the tenure may be extended for a year or so.

Parliament consists of the **Queen**, the **Senate** and the **House of Commons**.

The Queen

The Queen performs many ceremonial duties when visiting Canada.

The **Queen** is the formal head of the Canadian state. She is represented federally by the **Governor General**, and provincially by the **lieutenant-governors**. Federal acts begin: "Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons, enacts as follows..."; acts in most provinces begin with similar words. **Parliament** (or the provincial legislature) meets only at the royal summons; no house of Parliament (or legislature) is equipped with a self-starter. No federal or provincial bill becomes law without Royal Assent. The monarch has, on occasion, given the assent personally to federal acts, but the assent is usually given by the Governor General or a deputy, and to provincial acts by the lieutenant-governor or an administrator.

The Governor General and the lieutenant-governors have the right to be consulted by their ministers, and the right to encourage or warn them.

But they almost invariably must act on their ministers' advice, though there may be very rare occasions when they must, or may, act without advice or even against the advice of the ministers in office.

The Senate

The **Senate** usually has 105 members: 24 from the Maritime provinces (10 from Nova Scotia, 10 from New Brunswick, four from Prince Edward Island); 24 from Quebec; 24 from Ontario; 24 from the Western provinces (six each from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia); six from Newfoundland and Labrador; and one each from Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. There is provision also for four or eight extra senators to break a deadlock between the Senate and the House: either one or two each from the Maritime region, Quebec, Ontario and the West; but this has been used only once, in 1990.

The senators are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the prime minister. Senators must be at least 30 years old, and must have real estate worth \$4000 net, and total net assets of at least \$4000. They must reside in the province or territory for which they are appointed; in Quebec, they must reside, or have their property qualification, in the particular one of Quebec's 24 senatorial districts for which they are appointed. Till 1965, they held office for life; now, they hold office until age 75. The **Constitution Act, 1867** sets out certain grounds whereby senators can be

disqualified from office, including missing two consecutive sessions of Parliament.

The **Senate** can initiate any bills except bills providing for the *expenditure of public money* or *imposing taxes*. It can amend or reject any bill whatsoever. It can reject any bill as often as it sees fit. **No bill can become law unless it has been passed by the Senate.**

In theory these powers are formidable, but, as an appointed body, the Senate exercises its power with restraint. For over 40 years the Senate did not reject a bill passed by the House of Commons, and very rarely insisted on an amendment that the House rejected. Then, in 1988, it refused to pass the **Free Trade Agreement bill** until it had been submitted to the people in a general election. Since that time, there have been several other instances in which the Senate has rejected or simply not adopted bills before the end of a session, thereby effectively stopping them from becoming law.

Most of the amendments the Senate makes to bills passed by the Commons are clarifying or simplifying amendments, and are almost always accepted by the House of Commons. The Senate's main work is done in its committees, where it goes over bills clause by clause and hears evidence, often voluminous, from groups and individuals who would be affected by the particular bill under review. This committee work is especially effective because the Senate has many members with specialized knowledge and long years of legal, business or administrative experience. Their ranks may include ex-ministers, ex-premiers of provinces,

ex-mayors, eminent lawyers and experienced farmers.

The Senate also conducts investigations into important public concerns, such as mental health, aging, national security and defence, indigenous affairs, fisheries, and human rights. These investigations have produced valuable reports, which have often led to changes in legislation or government policies. The Senate usually does this kind of work far more cheaply than Royal Commissions or task forces, because its members are paid already and it has a permanent staff at its disposal.

The House of Commons

The **House of Commons** is the major law-making body. In each of the country's 338 constituencies, or ridings, the candidate who gets the largest number of votes is elected to the House of Commons, even if his or her vote is less than half the total. The number of constituencies may be changed after every 10-year census, pursuant to the **Constitution** and the **Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act**, which allot parliamentary seats roughly on the basis of population. Every province must have at least as many members in the Commons as it had in the Senate before 1982. The constituencies vary somewhat in size, within prescribed limits.

Political Parties

Our system could not work without political parties. Our major and minor federal parties were not created by any law, though they are now recognized by the law. We, the people, have created them ourselves. They are voluntary associations of people who hold broadly similar opinions on public questions.

The party that wins the largest number of seats in a general election ordinarily forms the government. Its leader is asked by the Governor General to become prime minister. If it has the most seats but not a clear majority, it may still be able to form a minority government with support from other parties; this has happened more than a dozen times since Confederation. If the government in office before an election comes out of the election with only the second largest number of seats, it still has the right to meet the new House of Commons and see whether it can get enough support from the minor parties to give it a majority of votes in the House and continue governing. This happened in 1925–26 with **Mackenzie King**, and in 1972 with **Pierre Trudeau**.

Area	Seats
Ontario	121
Quebec	78
British Columbia	42
Alberta	34
Manitoba	14
Saskatchewan	14
Nova Scotia	11
New Brunswick	10
Newfoundland and Labrador	7
Prince Edward Island	4
Northwest Territories	1
Nunavut	1
Yukon	1
Total	338

The second largest party (or, in the rare circumstances just described, the largest) becomes the official **Opposition** and its leader becomes the person holding the recognized position of **leader of the Opposition**. The leader of the Opposition gets the same salary as a minister. The leader of any party that has at least 12 seats also gets a higher salary than an ordinary member of the House of Commons.

Each of these recognized parties - including the government and the official Opposition - gets public money for research.

Why? Because we want criticism, we want watchfulness, we want the possibility of an effective alternative government if we are displeased with the one we have. The party system reflects the waves of opinion as they rise and wash through the country. There is much froth, but deep swells move beneath them, and they set the course of the ship.

The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister's official residence is **24 Sussex Drive**, a home originally named **Gorffwysfa**, Welsh for "a place of peace."

As we have already noted, the prime ministership (premiership), like the parties, is not created by law, though it is recognized by the law. The prime minister is normally a member of the **House of Commons** (there have been two from the Senate, from 1891 to 1892 and from 1894 to 1896). A non-member can hold the office but, by custom, must seek election to a seat very soon. A prime minister may lose his or her seat in an election, but can remain in office as long as the party has sufficient support in the House of Commons to be able to govern, though again, he or she must, by custom, win a seat very promptly. The traditional way of arranging this is to have a member of the party resign, thereby creating a vacancy, which gives the defeated prime minister the opportunity to run in a by-election. (This arrangement is also generally followed when the leader of the Opposition or other party leader does not have a seat.)

The prime minister is appointed by the **Governor General**. Ordinarily, the appointment is straightforward. If the **Opposition** wins more than half the seats in an election, or if the government is defeated in the **House of Commons** and resigns, the Governor General must call on the leader of the Opposition to form a new government.

The prime minister used to be described as "the first among equals" in the cabinet, or as "a moon among minor stars." This is no longer so. He or she is now incomparably more powerful than any colleague. The prime minister chooses the ministers in the first place, and can also ask any of them to resign; if the minister refuses, the prime minister can advise the Governor General to remove that minister and the advice would invariably be followed. Cabinet decisions do not necessarily go by majority vote. A strong prime minister, having listened to everyone's opinion, may simply announce that his or her view is the policy of the government, even if most, or all, the other ministers are opposed. Unless the dissenting ministers are prepared to resign, they must bow to the decision.

The Cabinet

As mentioned, the prime minister chooses the members of the cabinet. All of them must be or become members of the **Queen's Privy Council for Canada**. Privy Counsellors are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the prime

minister, and membership is for life, unless a member is dismissed by the Governor General on the same advice. All cabinet ministers and former cabinet ministers are always members, as are the **Chief Justice of Canada** and former chief justices and, usually, ex-Speakers of the Senate and of the House of Commons. Various other prominent citizens can be made members simply as a mark of honour. The whole Privy Council as such never meets. Only the ministers and a handful of non-ministers attend the rare ceremonial occasions when the Privy Council is called together, such as proclaiming the accession of a new King or Queen and consenting to a royal marriage. The cabinet, "the Committee of the Privy Council," is the Council's operative body.

By custom, almost all the members of the cabinet must be members of the House of Commons, or, if not already members, must win seats. Since **Confederation**, on occasion, people who were not members of either house have been appointed to the cabinet (as happened most recently in 1996 and 2006), but they had to get seats in the House or the Senate within a reasonable time, or resign from the cabinet. **General Andrew McNaughton** was **Minister of National Defence** for nine months in 1944–45 without a seat in either house, but after he had twice failed to get elected to the Commons, he had to resign.

Senators can be members of the cabinet; the first cabinet, of 13 members, had five senators. Twice between 1979 and 1984, there were three or four senators in the cabinet. The **Conservatives**, in 1979, elected very few MPs from Quebec, and the **Liberals**, in 1980, elected only two from the four Western provinces. So both parties had to eke out the necessary cabinet representation for the respective provinces by appointing more senators to the cabinet. Until recently, most senators appointed leader of the government in the Senate were cabinet ministers. No senator can sit in the House of Commons, and no member of the House of Commons can sit in the Senate. But a minister from the House of Commons may, by invitation of the Senate, come to that chamber and speak (though not vote).

By custom, every province must, if possible, have at least one cabinet minister. Of course, if a province does not elect any government supporters, this becomes difficult. In that case, the prime minister may put a senator from that province into the cabinet, or get some member from another province to resign his or her seat and then try to get a person from the "missing" province elected there. In 1921, the Liberals did not elect a single member from Alberta. The Prime Minister, Mr. King, solved the problem of Alberta representation in the cabinet by getting the Hon. Charles Stewart, Liberal ex-premier of Alberta, nominated in the Quebec constituency of Argenteuil and then elected. Whether Mr. King's ploy would work now is quite another question. The voters of today do not always look with favour upon outside candidates being "parachuted" into their ridings. The smallest province, Prince Edward Island, has often gone unrepresented in the cabinet for years at a stretch.

By custom *also*, Ontario and Quebec usually have 10 or 12 ministers each, provided each province has elected enough government supporters to warrant such a number. Historically, at least one minister from Quebec was an English-speaking Protestant, and there was at least one minister from the French-speaking minorities outside Quebec, normally from New Brunswick or Ontario, or both. It also used to be necessary to have at least one English-speaking (usually Irish) Roman Catholic minister. Since the appointment of the **Hon. Ellen Fairclough** to the

cabinet in 1957, women have won increased recognition, and cabinet appointments now better reflect Canada's diverse and multicultural population.

The Speakers

The **Speaker of the Senate** is appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the prime minister.

The Speaker of the House of Commons is elected by the House itself after each general election or if a vacancy occurs. He or she must be a member of the House. The Speaker is its presiding officer, decides all questions of procedure and order, oversees the House of Commons staff, and is expected to be impartial, non-partisan and as firm in enforcing the rules against the prime minister as against the humblest opposition backbencher. The Speaker withdraws from day-to-day party activities; for example, he or she does not attend caucus meetings.

For many years, the Commons' Speaker was nominated by the prime minister. In 1985, *however*, the Commons adopted a new system whereby the Speaker was elected by secret ballot in the Commons chamber. Any member, except ministers of the Crown, party leaders and anyone holding an office within the House, may stand for election. The system goes a considerable way toward securing the Speaker against any lingering suspicion that he or she is the government's choice and that the speakership is simply one of a number of prime ministerial appointments. Since the introduction of the secret ballot election, the Speaker has occasionally been re-elected following a change of government.

This new procedure also resulted in a break with the earlier custom of an alternating French- and English-speaking Speaker in the Commons. Similarly, it used to be the case in the House of Commons that if the Speaker was English-speaking, the Deputy Speaker must be French-speaking, and *vice versa*; this is no longer always true. The Deputy Speaker has occasionally been chosen from one of the opposition parties.

In many instances, an anglophone Speaker of the Senate has been succeeded by a francophone, and *vice versa*. However, since 1980, the pattern of alternating linguistic groups has not been maintained.

Jews in Canada

Mz. Harleffie Pussy

Jews in Canada for more than 250 years, with the first recorded Jewish newcomer settling in Trois-Rivières, Québec, in 1760. Most of the early Jewish families settled in Québec, arriving mainly from Western and Central Europe. In 1832, 26 years before Great Britain, Québec became the first jurisdiction in the British Empire to accord full rights to Jews.

Jewish immigrants came to Canada in far greater numbers between 1880-and-1920 arriving from Romania, Russia, Poland, Lithuania and other parts of Eastern Europe. The largest waves of immigration followed political turmoil in these countries, often accompanied by violent campaigns against Jews living there. Assisted by international charitable organizations, some of these new immigrants built their new lives in Canada on farms in the West or in the Laurentian Mountains of Québec.

Over time, many Jews settled and established their businesses and institutions in major Canadian cities such as Toronto, Winnipeg and Montreal. In the cities, the Jewish population were often peddlers at first, later building their own small businesses. Many went into the textile industry.

By 1924, immigration restrictions made it more difficult for Jews to come to Canada, a situation that was to last until after World War II. Despite the efforts of Jewish agencies such as the **Canadian Jewish Congress**, very few Jewish refugees were admitted to Canada during the Holocaust™, a result of the infamous **"none is too many"** immigration policy for Jews. Only 5000 Jewish refugees were admitted to Canada between 1933-and-1948, the lowest number of any Western country.

When Canada finally opened its doors to post-War immigrants, thousands of Holocaust™ survivors, displaced from various European countries, came to settle in Canada. More than 12,000 settled in Montreal and approximately 8,000 in Toronto.

In the years that followed, arrivals of large groups of Jewish immigrants were usually tied to political conditions in their home countries. Many Hungarian Jews arrived after the 1956 revolution. Many Jewish refugees from Iraq and Egypt came to Canada during the 1950s, followed by a wave of Romanian Jews in the 1960s. Starting in the 1970s, Jews from the Soviet Union began to arrive, initially in small groups and often as a result of Canadian advocacy efforts.

The cultural and linguistic character of the Jewish community of Montréal started to change in the late 1960s with the influx of francophone Sephardic Jews from France and North Africa. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, immigration from this region, especially Morocco, became the predominant new Jewish immigrant group in Québec, with their French-language background facilitating their successful integration into Québec society. This group now constitutes a sizeable proportion of Montréal's Jewish population.

Political and economic factors have continued to influence trends in Jewish immigration to Canada in recent years. Since 1990, new immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union have significantly changed the face of the Jewish community, with Russian signage now becoming visible at many Jewish community buildings.



Aaron Hart

In 1760, ☆ **Aaron Hart** – considered the **founding father of Canada's Jewish community** – arrived in Montréal with British general Amherst and his troops. Hart moved to Trois-Rivière, built a successful business and contributed to public life. The second post office in Canada, *for example*, was in Hart's home. In 1768, he co-founded Canada's first synagogue: the **Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue in Montréal**.

His son ☆ **Ezekiel Hart** went on to become a pioneer in civic life. He was elected to the **Lower Canada Assembly** in 1807 but was denied admission as his colleagues voted to bar him from sitting in the Assembly on account that he could not take his oath of office as a Christian. Persistent as ever, Hart was re-elected in 1808 and, though he constantly affirmed he was justified in taking his oath on the Hebrew Bible, took the regular oath and sat in the Assembly. He endured social hostility and even outright anti-Semitism to serve Lower Canada.

In 1832, Lower Canada became the first jurisdiction in the British Empire to grant Jews full legal equality (26 years before Great Britain did so).

In 1858, the first Jewish mayor was elected in Canada ☆ (**William J. Hyman** in Cap-des-Rosiers).

In 1871, ☆ **Henry Nathan** of Victoria was the first Jewish Canadian elected to the House of Commons.

In 1955, ☆ **David Croll**, a WWII veteran, was the first Jewish Canadian appointed to the **Senate**. Croll had served in the **House of Commons** and was considered one of the smartest members of the governing caucus, but was never appointed to Cabinet. At the time, a **Globe and Mail** columnist speculated that this was due to "racial stigma" and suggested Croll was not in cabinet as a result of "discrimination by procrastination." Croll had previously made history as the first Jewish Canadian appointed to a provincial cabinet (in 1937).

In 1960 ☆ **Tillie Taylor** became Saskatchewan's first female magistrate – and later went on to become the first chair of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission (in 1972).

In 1969, ☆ **Herb Gray** became the first Jewish Canadian appointed to the federal cabinet.

In 1970, ☆ **Bora Laskin** became the first Jewish Canadian appointed to the **Supreme Court**. As a young lawyer, Laskin had been unable to find work due to substantial anti-Semitism in legal firms in Canada at the time, despite his stellar academic record from the University of Toronto and Harvard Law. Laskin went on to become **Chief Justice** in 1973.

In 2004, ☆ **Rosalie Abella** became the first Jewish woman to be appointed to the **Supreme Court of Canada**

Jewish Canadians have been deeply engaged in Canadian innovation, culture, business, and public policy.



☆ **Celia Franca**, founder of the National Ballet of Canada

In 1887, ☆ **Emile Berliner**, a Jewish immigrant to Montréal, invented the gramophone. Since then, Jewish Canadians have contributed significantly to a wide range of research and business fields, including medicine, law, academia, sports, manufacturing, retail, construction, and real estate – to name just a few.

Jewish Canadians have contributed immensely to the fields of literature (☆ Adele Wiseman and ☆ Mordechai Richler), journalism (☆ Sonia Ben Ezra and ☆ Barbara Frum) music (☆ Leonard Cohen

and ☆ Drake), and television and film (☆ Ivan Reitman, ☆ Lorne Michaels, ☆ David Cronenberg, ☆ William Shatner, ☆ Eugene Levy, ☆ Rick Moranis and ☆ Seth Rogen), sports (☆ Cecil Hart, ☆ Bobbie Rosenfeld and ☆ Louis Rubenstein) and dance (☆ Celia Franca, ☆ Pauline Donalda, and ☆ Melissa Hayden).

Jewish Canadians have had an indelible impact on Canadian public policy over the 20th Century and to the present day, with significant public service from – to name just a few – ☆ David Lewis, ☆ Herb Gray, ☆ Irwin Cotler, ☆ Rosalie Abella, ☆ Marshall Rothstein, and Canada's first Jewish Finance Minister – ☆ Joe Oliver.

Jewish Canadians have a long and proud history of serving Canada during times of war.

☆ Ezekiel Hart, *mentioned above*, was a pioneer in Jewish military service. As an officer in the 8th Battalion of Trois-Rivières militia – under Lieutenant Colonel Charles-Michel d'Irumberry de Salaberry – Hart served in the defense of Lower Canada in the War of 1812. Hart eventually rose in the ranks from Lieutenant to Colonel.



Major General Ed Fitch

Jewish community archives bear the names of 577 Jewish Canadians known to have died while serving in Canada's Armed Forces in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War.

In World War I, records – which are incomplete and therefore considered a low-ball estimate – show approximately 4700 Jewish Canadians served in Canada's Armed Forces.

In World War II, some 17,000 Jewish Canadians – more than one in five Jewish males across the country – served in Canada's Armed Forces. In total, 9.6% of Jewish Canadians served in Canada's Armed Forces, a rate 10% above the national average.

Since the two world wars, Jewish Canadians have served with distinction in Canada's Armed Forces in Korea, peacekeeping missions around the world, and in Afghanistan.

Jewish Canadians have risen through the ranks to serve among Canada's top commanders. The two highest ranking Jewish officers in Canadian history were ☆ **Major-General Robert Rothschild** (who served during WWII, landed on D-Day, and was wounded in the *Battle of Normandy* in July 1944), and ☆ **Major-General Ed Fitch**, who served in various peacekeeping missions and played a major role in Operation PODIUM, the Canadian Forces operation to protect the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics from terrorism. Today, Major-General Fitch is retired, lives in Victoria, and is an active member of the Jewish community (serving on the Board of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs – CIJA).

Canada's Middle-East Policy and the "Jewish Lobby"

Adam Cutler

An examination of the role interest groups play in the formation of foreign policy, particularly Middle-East policy, can quickly turn into a polemical argument. While this paper examines the extent to which the organized Canadian Jewish community has been able to mould Canadian Middle-East foreign policy with respect to the Middle-East, it does not take a normative stance on the issue. However, ethnic group influence on policy development can have considerable theoretical significance depending on one's view of democracy. For those who believe that foreign policy development should remain within the realm of governmental bureaucracy, then a finding of considerable influence by the "Jewish Lobby" ¹ will be disconcerting. In contrast, those who believe that members of civil society should play a strong role in policy formation may be comforted by a finding that the Jewish community has been able to sway foreign policy to its liking. However, if ² the "Jewish Lobby" has influenced foreign policy out of proportion to its representation in the Canadian population, especially when compared with the country's Arab-Canadian population, then this may be an issue of concern. Moreover, using the "Jewish Lobby" as a model, professional lobbyists can discover best and worst lobbying practices. The theoretical implications of this study are clear, even if Canada's influence in the Middle East peace process is minimal. As ☆ **Janice Gross Stein** writes, "Canada has a policy on the Middle-East but not in the Middle-East" (Stein's emphasis) (1976-1977:272). Yet, the bulk of scholarly literature on this subject focuses not on the question of Canada's influence, but rather on what sort of bias is present in Canadian policy-making. The literature presents a wide range of opinions as to whether Canadian foreign policy has had a pro-Israel tilt and, if such a tilt exists, whether it can be attributed to the "Jewish Lobby." Consequently, this paper will study Canadian foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the Middle-East from 1945 until the present, ³ focusing on doctrines, major decisions, and resource allocation. It will include an examination of the different factors contributing to Canada's foreign policy, with an eye towards the role of the "Jewish Lobby." A critique of select writings in this area will also be given. This paper shall argue that the "Jewish Lobby" has had little influence in the development of Canada's Middle-East foreign policy.

Introduction: Canada's Behaviour Regarding the Middle-East from 1945-2004

The Birth of Israel ³

Canada became a reluctant, yet involved participant in the Palestine question following World War Two. Britain handed its mandate over Palestine to the United Nations in 1947 and Canada, though attempting to stay uninvolved was out-manoeuvred and appointed to the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)**. In order not to be bound by any decision emanating from UNSCOP, Canada appointed a Supreme Court Justice, **Ivan Rand** - 'probably the greatest judge in Canada's history' - rather than a career bureaucrat to the committee. UNSCOP's majority report, supported by Rand, called for the partition of Palestine and the creation of one Arab and one Jewish state. Canada eventually voted for this motion at the **United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)** (Bercusson 1984).



Ivan Rand

The Early Years of Israeli Statehood from 1950-1967

The 1950's was an era of major changes in the Middle-East. The English and French withdrew, while the United States and Soviet Union moved in. Arms trade soon became a major issue. Israel, lacking a habitual source, turned to Canada for help. After much internal wrangling, **Lester B. Pearson**, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, agreed to sell weapons to Israel. The deal eventually fell through, due to the onset of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Nevertheless, Israel was still thankful to Canada and was even pleased that it was able to get out of the deal for business reasons (Oren 1990). Canada's initial reaction to the Suez crisis was an abstention to a UNGA vote (Ismael 1994:17). Following the war's end, Canadian involvement was assured when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson spearheaded the creation of UN peacekeeping. Canada committed troops and significant diplomatic resources to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the UN's first peacekeeping force. ⁴ Following the 1967 war, Canada again provided troops for peacekeeping forces. Additionally, Canada supported United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242, which called for, upon other things, "[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." It also called for a just settlement of the refugee problem and the security of all states in the region. The Trudeau Years Canada's approach to peacekeeping was modified under Trudeau. While Canada was unconditionally willing to join the UN in peacekeeping missions in 1956 and 1967, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Canada set restrictions to its involvement (Miller 1991:26-27). In the diplomatic arena, by 1975, Canada announced the opening of two new embassies in Arab countries and began official relations with three others. By 1983, Canada had diplomatic relations with all the countries in the Middle-East and North Africa, with ten embassies in the area (Stein 1984:8-9). More than any other objective, Canada pursued its economic interests in the region. Related to economic objectives was the Arab boycott of Israel. Through the secondary boycott⁴ and tertiary boycott⁵ Arab states attempted to prevent Canada and Canadian businesses from doing business with Israel, Israeli corporations, Canadian corporations that did business with Israel and Canadian corporations that did business with Israeli corporations. While the United States easily passed anti-boycott legislation, ⁵ preventing American businesses from knowingly partaking in the Arab boycott, Canada did not legislate on the issue, choosing only to draft administrative guidelines with strong enforcement mechanisms (Taras and Weinfeld 1990:671; Stanislawski 1989:70-71). Ontario, *however*, did pass anti-boycott measures (Taras 1989:56). In 1982, Israel invaded South Lebanon. Canada was the first Western country to criticize Israel and call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Canada, *however*, did not enact sanctions against Israel (Miller 1991:59).

Several other smaller issues came about during Trudeau's reign. **First**, there was a growing trend in international circles to recognize not only individual Palestinian rights, something Canada had done since 1949, but collective Palestinian rights as well. Canada did begin to recognize those rights; *however*, it refused, for an extended period of time to recognize the **Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)** as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people. **Second**, the 1975 U.N. Crime Conference was scheduled for Toronto. Because they had U.N. recognition, the PLO planned on attending the conference. This was problematic because Canada regarded the PLO as a terrorist organization. Canada postponed the conference, ensuring it would not be held in Toronto. **Third**, Canada voted against the **U.N. Zionism** is Racism resolution in November 1975 (Miller 1991). The **Jerusalem Embassy Affair** on 25 April 1979, **Joe Clark**, then leader of Canada's Progressive Conservative Party, announced that if elected he would move Canada's embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. This promise continued until 29 October 1979, when as Prime Minister, Clark confirmed that the embassy would not move until the status of Jerusalem was determined through peace negotiations (Flicker 2002-2003).⁶

The Mulroney and Chrétien Years

The major events under Mulroney and Chrétien in the Middle-East were the two Palestinian uprisings, lasting from 1987-to-1993 and 2000-until-the present. The initial reaction of Canada's government to the first Palestinian uprising was a pronouncement by **Prime Minister Brian Mulroney** in which he stated that Israel had acted with "restraint" in response to Palestinian violence (Miller 1991:82). However, soon afterwards, then **Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark** gave a strongly worded speech in which he accused Israel of human rights abuses such as withholding food as a form of collective punishment, and violating international law (Miller 1991:100). Mulroney, too busy negotiating a free-trade agreement with the United States, let Clark handle the Middle-East portfolio. Regarding the second uprising, Canada's reaction has generally been muted. Canada continues to support direct peace negotiations and **UNSCR 242**. With respect to non-conflict issues, Canada has continued to pursue its strategy of bilateralism by signing free trade agreements with Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

Determining Factors in Canada's Middle-East Foreign Policy Doctrines

Due to the fact that the Middle-East has never been a main priority for Canada's foreign policy makers, detailed policy statements are largely absent. Declarations by parliamentarians at the annual **Canada-Israel Committee (CIC)** dinner are potentially fruitful grounds for a foreign policy doctrine; *however*, these statements often emanate from guests who are "pressed to outdo one another in their tributes to Israel and pledges⁶ of support" (Lyon 1992-1993:8) and are therefore not overly dependable sources. Doctrine must therefore be drawn from comments made in Parliament and foreign policy decisions that extend beyond the Middle-East. Canada's Middle-East foreign policy doctrine from the end of the Second World War until Trudeau's foreign policy review is one of detached liberal internationalism. **Prime Minister Mackenzie King**, who ended his term in 1948, tried to stay as uninvolved in the region as possible. In a 16 July 1946 statement, King proclaimed, "I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by a statement on the situation in Palestine by the Canadian government at the present moment" (Kay 1978:71). Under **St.-Laurent, Diefenbaker, and Pearson**, Ottawa felt more compelled to act and was guided by a dedication to the U.N., while attempting at the same time to act as a middle-man between the U.S. and U.K. (Bercusson 1984). The major shift in doctrine came under

Trudeau, soon after his 1968 election. He called for a foreign policy review, eventually culminating in a publication titled *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. This signified a significant shift in tone for Canada with respect to the Middle-East. Canada's new goals in the region would be to pursue its national interest by maximizing its own national security, economic growth and independence (Stein 1976-1977:275). This approach included the pursuit of bilateralism in Middle-East affairs (Stein 1984). Under Trudeau and beyond, Canada's Middle-East doctrine also endorsed a commitment to **UNSCR 242**, a recognition of the legitimacy and secured existence of all states in the region and a stated dedication to peacekeeping and the care of refugees (Ismael 1994; Sucharov 2003). A more recent element of this doctrine is Canada's commitment to human security (Sucharov 2003). However, with respect to the Arab-⁷ Israeli conflict, the term, "human security" is most often used in reference to refugee issues. Seemingly, neither Canada's initial doctrine of multilateralism or subsequent preference of pursuing its national interests indicates a tilt in its Middle-East foreign policy one way or another. A look at some major decisions made in the past fifty years will help determine if such a tilt exists, and if so, whether the "Jewish Lobby" is responsible for it.

Major Decisions: The "Jewish Lobby" and other Influences

In the words of one cabinet member of Mackenzie King's government, Canada supported the partition of Mandate Palestine into Jewish and Arab territories in 1948 because it was "the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives" (Bercusson 1989:30). Canada's decision to vote for partition also fit into Canada's doctrine of acting as a voice of reason between major powers while supporting the United Nations (Ismael 1994:12). According to a secret **Department of External Affairs (DEA)** report, the government feared that a failure to adopt partition may discredit the Jewish Agency,⁸ thereby thrusting Jewish extremists into power and creating internal strife within Palestine's Jewish community, an outcome that would only further strain U.N.-U.K. relations. In accordance with Canadian doctrine, Ottawa also wanted to ensure that the U.S.-U.K. relationship was stable, particularly in light of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** discussions then being held (Bercusson 1984:16). Additionally, the report concluded, if the U.N. failed to act on the **Palestine Question**, it would be discredited as a useful agency, and partition was the only plan likely to garner the two-thirds majority vote required for a resolution to pass (Bercusson 1989:30-31).⁹ In the case of partition, "official Canadian views and the aspirations of Canadian Zionists were parallel but unconnected" (Bercusson 1989:31). This is not to say that Jewish/Zionist lobby groups were not active during this period. Letters were sent to the government and presentations were made to politicians (Kay 1978:115-127). An attempt by King to curry the Jewish vote should not be considered as the impetus for Canada's vote on partition because the Liberal leadership knew that Jews were very unlikely to vote for the Conservative party and that the Jewish leadership was integrally tied to Liberal politics (Bercusson 1989:29). A few months after the partition vote, Canada agreed to a special U.N. session called at the request of the U.S., which had as one suggestion the removal of partition and the implementation of trusteeship, an idea loathed by Zionists. This demonstrates the lack of influence the "Jewish Lobby" had at that time. Yet it is important that both Bercusson (1989:31) and Taras (1989:45) at least partially credit "Jewish Lobbying" for Canada's eventual recognition of the Jewish state in December 1948. After voting for partition, Canada's next major Middle-East decision was the creation of the United Nations Peacekeeping force during the Suez crisis. Again, this can be linked to Canada's interest in maintaining a strong relationship

between the U.S. and U.K.¹⁰

The peacekeeping plan enabled the French and English to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula without losing face, as demanded by the Americans (Ismael 1994:18). Little is written about Jewish lobbying during this time. However, the presence of the peacekeeping forces proved beneficial to both Israel and Egypt. For Israel, a guarantee was made for free navigation in the Gulf of Eilat, the Straits of Tiran were opened, and an international military force created a buffer between Israel and what was perceived to be a hostile Egyptian enemy (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004).

In the meantime, Egypt witnessed a withdrawal of hostile international troops from its sovereign territory. Canada acted in a similarly multilateralist fashion following the 1967 war, remaining even-handed while supporting another peacekeeping mission. The "Jewish Lobby" during these years likely had little effect on Canadian policy because it was "intermittent, *ad hoc*, and inconsistent" (Taras 1989:51). Six years later came the 1973 Middle-East war. In this instance, Canada's refusal to condemn the attacking Arab states and conditional commitment to further peacekeeping could be explained by Trudeau's policy of pursuing national interests. While it was clear that Arab states had initiated the violence, Ottawa did not rebuke them, thereby avoiding the potentially devastating effects of an Arab oil embargo on the Canadian economy. Moreover, Ottawa's provisional commitment to peacekeeping, juxtaposed to its unconditional commitment in 1956 and 1967, could be explained by Canada's new unwillingness to support ventures that would be detrimental to the country's well being (Miller 1991:26; Goldberg 1989:106-108). Canada wanted guarantees¹¹ that it would have the full backing of the U.N. Security Council and that all 11 parties involved in the Middle-East conflict were supportive of the peacekeeping force (Ismael 1994:26). Like most Middle-East issues, the 1973 war brought about lobbying by Jewish and Arab communities in Canada. Jewish communities wanted the government to fully condemn the attacking Arab states, whereas the Arab communities wished for the Canadian government to recognize that the war's cause was Israel's continuing denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination. The government appears to have walked a fine line between both lobby groups while acting in accordance with its own doctrine of pursuing national interests. Generally, despite the lack of a condemnation from Ottawa, the Jewish community was pleased with the government's reaction to the war because they felt that they had support in parliament (Goldberg 1989:107).

Following the 1973 war, Canada's next major decision *vis-à-vis* the Middle-East was the **recognition of the PLO**. The primary showdown in this area was the U.N. Crime Conference debacle. Here, no clear argument for national interest can be made.¹⁰ Additionally, the conference was to take place in Toronto, home of Canada's largest Jewish community and the "Jewish Lobby" fought hard to have the PLO denied entrance. The Arab community, in their first real foray into Canadian foreign policy lobbying, fought equally hard to have the PLO invited (Goldberg 1989:108-110).

The third important domestic actor was the **Department of External Affairs**. They opted for a conciliatory approach, which would involve only denying entry to those PLO representatives known to be terrorists (Stein 1976-1977:286). It would be easy to hold the "Jewish Lobby"¹² responsible for having the government postpone the conference, thereby effectively denying the PLO admission into Canada. However, several other vocal groups opposed the PLO's presence in Canada, arguing that Canada's laws and opposition to terrorism prohibited the entrance of PLO members (Stein 1976-1977:285). Additionally important is that Canada had not yet recognized the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people (Ismael 1994:52). It follows, then, that Canada would have no reason to want PLO representatives at the

conference. Furthermore, analysts argued that Canada's failure to recognize the PLO would not impede improved relations with the Arab world (Stein 1976-1977:282). Notwithstanding the last few points, in the case of the U.N. Crime Conference, it can be reasonably argued that the "Jewish Lobby" had some effect. However, whatever power the "Jewish Lobby" had did not last for long. Despite their prolonged efforts to have Canada enact anti-boycott legislation, the CIC completely failed. The Arab-Canadian community was fairly silent on the issue, but very satisfied with the government's inaction. Furthermore, the Canadian business community, a new player in foreign policy lobbying, had fought hard and won against anti-boycott legislation that could negatively impact the newly discovered "Arab market."¹³ The battle against anti-boycott legislation was won by the corporate lobby and Canadian Middle-East foreign policy doctrine. The **Jerusalem Embassy affair** was won by the same combination of doctrine and lobbying. Again, corporate Canada lobbied, claiming that they stood to lose Arab business if Canada moved the embassy to Jerusalem.¹⁴ The Jewish community was ultimately united in their feelings of disappointment toward the handling of the whole affair, upset by the transformation of Jerusalem and Israel into a partisan issue during an election campaign and Joe Clark's "flip-flop" on the matter. Arab-Canadians, however were fairly pleased with the result of the affair, having been very involved in lobbying and stressing that the embassy should not be moved. The **Stanfield Report**, upon which Clark made his final decision not to move the embassy, reflected the arguments of corporate Canada and the DEA. (Flicker 2002-2003; Goldberg 1989:112-114; Takach 1989; Taras 1984:21). By the time the **Lebanon War** broke-out three years later, the economic significance of the Middle-East was in decline and Lebanon was particularly inconsequential for the Canadian market. This may help to explain why the corporate **Association of Construction Engineers of Canada (ATCO)**, **Canadian Bechtel**, and **Canadian Westinghouse** (Goldberg 1989:111). Bell Canada's situation is particularly pertinent as it had at that time a \$1.1 billion contract with the government of Saudi Arabia. Both Bell Canada and the Canadian government saw this contract as a major success for Canadian export policy (Stanislowski 1989:74-77).

[] sector was noticeably uninvolved in lobbying surrounding the war. In point of fact, there was little time for lobbying on the issue because **Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau** almost immediately condemned Israel for its invasion of Lebanon. This upset the Jewish community, who wanted Trudeau to make more balanced statements and call on all foreign armies including the PLO and the Syrian army to leave the country. The DEA approved of Trudeau's approach, which the Prime Minister himself viewed one as effective neutrality.¹⁵ Canada's Arab communities would have preferred an even stronger condemnation of Israel, along with sanctions (Goldberg 1989:114-116; Miller 1991; Taras 1984:21). Trudeau's condemnation of the invasion was in line with the Canadian policy toward sovereignty and territoriality as expressed in UNSCR 242. Furthermore, his avoidance of sanctions against Israel was in accordance with Canada's economic approach to the Middle-East. While the media's affect on Trudeau was unknown, Dewitt and Kirton (1989) demonstrate that it was able to affect the attitude of Canadian parliamentarians more than any other factor, perhaps explaining their increasing anti-Israel stances during the Lebanon War. Moreover, Trudeau was by this point developing a strong dislike for the "Jewish Lobby." He refused to meet with the CIC and the Canadian Jewish Congress was unable to persuade him to take a less hostile stance toward Israel (Miller 1991:58-60). Also upsetting for the Jewish-Canadian communities was their government's response to the first Palestinian uprising. While the communities welcomed Prime Minister Mulroney's initial reaction that Israel was acting with "restraint," the comments of **Joe Clark** were less warmly accepted. The Canadian-Arab community had the exact opposite

reaction, while the corporate sector did not comment. The DEA bureaucrats were pleased with Clark and saw his statements as taking Canadian Middle-East foreign policy towards a more pro-Palestinian position, something they encouraged. Clark, *however*, may not have been developing new policy. The CIC had long noticed a trend toward greater sympathy for the Palestinians in Canadian Middle-East policy, and Clarke's position could be understood as proceeding with Canada's long-term policy focus on refugees. It was his "tone, insensitivity, and timing" that led to the Jewish community's harsh reaction (Miller 1991:97). Additionally, as opposed to the oft felt feeling that Middle-East policy was out of their hands (Lyon 1992-1993), the DEA believed they were successful in crafting Canada's stance during this time (Goldberg 1989:116-118). Dewitt (1989) posits that the uprising changed the "facts on the ground" and that the Mulroney government in turn began to sympathize with the Palestinians and develop a more balanced policy. In terms of the **second Palestinian uprising** beginning in 2000, Canada's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained consistent with previously stated positions, namely the support for direct negotiations and UNSCR 242. This was particularly clear under **Prime Minister Jean Chrétien**, who placed little emphasis on the Middle-East. Canada's increased concern with human security issues within and outside of the Middle East has heartened some in the Arab community (Sucharov 2003). As for the business community, it remains relatively uninvolved.

Of all the aforementioned major decisions in Canadian foreign policy, only Canada's partition plan position, recognition of Israel, peace-keeping position and UN¹⁶ Crime Conference position can be regarded as specifically pro-Israel. Among these, only Canada's position on the recognition of Israel and the U.N. Crime Conference can be somewhat ascribed to pressure from the "Jewish Lobby."

While this is not supportive of the notion that the "Jewish Lobby" controls Canadian Middle-East foreign policy, perhaps a look at the lobby's affect on Canadian resource distribution in the Middle-East will. Resource Distribution and its Determinants Canada's resource distribution in the Middle-East has largely been in the form of supporting peacekeeping missions, official development assistance, involvement in multilateral working groups, diplomatic missions and trips abroad. They demonstrate a focus on refugee issues, even-handedness, and bilateralism. Recognizing its limits in affecting the Middle-East political situation since the 1970s, Canada has focused its resources on attempting to create an environment conducive to peacemaking (Ismael 1994:110-111).

Canadians have served on the **UNSCOP**, as director generals of **UNRWA**, as chiefs of staff for observers, and on the Conciliation Committee negotiating team. **Prime Minister Pearson** spent significant time developing the idea of peacekeeping. All this is in addition to the money spent on the Canadian peacekeeping forces that have served in all six Arab-Israeli peacekeeping missions (Ismael 1994:9,13-14). In the years following Trudeau's foreign policy review, Canada demonstrated an increased desire to associate with the Arab world outside of the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Miller 1991:10).

By 1975, Canada had announced the opening of embassies in Saudi Arabia and Iraq along with diplomatic relations with Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. By 1983, Canada had diplomatic relations with all 17 the countries in the Middle-East and North Africa, with ten embassies in the region. Such a commitment of resources from a limited pool reflects devotion to the area (Stein 1984:8-9). This increased association included the funding of 34 projects with Arab aid agencies through an allocation of \$384 million from the **Canada International Development Agency (CIDA)**. CIDA also funded one project with Israel to the

Dominican Republic (Stein 1984:9). Under Trudeau, Canada continued to support peacekeeping missions. In 1975, the U.N. assessed Canada for \$3.8 million for the **UNEF** and the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**, which supervises the **Golan Heights** disengagement. This fee was in addition to the cost of maintaining troops at home (Stein 1976-1977:278-279). Most recently, Canada's primary multilateral working group served as chair for the working group on refugees that emerged from the **1991 Madrid peace conference**. While the group effectively disbanded in 1996, Canada continues to be engaged in modest humanitarian efforts, providing about \$130 million to development in the region. Additionally, Canada is a member of the **Ad Hoc Liaison Committee**, which coordinates aid to the Palestinian people (Sucharov 2003). Furthermore, Canada is one of UNRWA's top donors to this day (Ismael 1994:14).

During the first **Gulf War**, Canada provided \$5 million and 10,000 gas masks to the Palestinians, while giving \$500,000 in support to Israeli civilians affected by Iraqi missile attacks. Canada also gave \$1 million in medical aid to refugees and another \$2 million in emergency food aid (Ismael 1994:96). From 1991-1992 Canada provided a total of \$295 million in humanitarian assistance to the Middle-East (Ismael 1994:110).

None of the resources distributed above indicate a pro-Israel tilt. As a developed country, Israel does not receive official development assistance, while many Arab states and the Palestinian Authority receive assistance from Canada. Canada's UNRWA contributions go directly to assist Palestinian refugees. Trips abroad, diplomatic missions and involvement in peacekeeping and working groups are all neutral activities designed for the pursuit of peace or to enhance bilateral relations. While Canada has more diplomatic missions in the Arab world than the Jewish world, that is because there are twenty-two Arab states (along with the Palestinian Authority) and only one Jewish state. If Canada's resource distribution in the Middle-East indicates any tilt at all, it is toward the Arab states. Nothing indicates that the "Jewish Lobby" has sought Canadian resources.

Summation, Suggestions, and Conclusion

Neither doctrine nor resource distribution indicates a pro-Israel tilt in Canada's Middle-East policy. Certain major decisions can be construed as being pro-Israel, yet only few of them can be attributed to the influence of the "Jewish Lobby." Why, then, do some authors posit that Canada's Middle-East policy has a pro-Israel tilt? Additionally, why is there a widespread perception that domestic interests have a stranglehold on Canada's Middle-East policy (Taras 1984:17)? Moreover, how is it that in a 1987 poll of DEA bureaucrats, the "Jewish Lobby" was ranked as having the most influence over Canada's Middle-East foreign policy, even more than the Prime Minister (Kirton and Lyon 1989)?

Concerning why some authors argue that Canada's Middle-East policies have a pro-Israel tilt, this paper suggests the following: firstly, in some decisions, Canada's position has been pro-Israel. However, rather than understanding these positions as being pro-Israel, they should be understood as having been made for national self interest. This selfishness was guided by an attempt to mediate between major powers in the 1950's-and-60's, and later guided by the pursuit of economic goals.

Secondly, those who argue that Canada's policy has a pro-Israel tilt focus their claims on minor rather than major decisions. Foreign policy involves many issues including trade, peacekeeping, migration, environment and culture. While governmental decisions concerning minor issues may indicate a particular foreign policy, they cannot be used to refute foreign policy understandings based on major decisions unless they are aggregated and interpreted in a systematic way. Ismael (1994) overly relies on Canada's UN voting record, which is a predominantly minor issue, in his

judgment that Canada's foreign policy has a pro-Israel tilt, while underestimating the significance of the **Jerusalem Embassy affair** and other major issues.

Thirdly, both Ismael (1994) and Lyon (1992-1993), come to mistaken conclusions due to their clear anti-Israel stances. For Ismael, his anti-Israel attitude is apparent to any student of the Middle-East. In addition to the omission of Israel on the book's cover-map of the Middle-East, he never misses an opportunity to criticize Israel for alleged violations of international law or for abusing Palestinian human rights. He misrepresents Israel's foundational ideology despite overwhelming support against his assertions in Israel's declaration of independence.

Furthermore, he makes unsubstantiated references such as one referring to the "Zionist-dominated media" in Canada (51). Lyon's (1992-1993), negative attitude towards the "Jewish Lobby" is much more subtle than Ismael's; nevertheless, he lets his own sympathies show in his footnotes

Ishmael's negative attitude towards Israel and Peyton's negative attitude towards the pro-Israel lobby can affect the objectivity of their scholarship. As for the belief that Canada's foreign policy is dominated by domestic interests and that the CIC is a **"powerful and feared Zionist lobby"** (Ismael 1994:51), it would be easy to dismiss these allegations as unsubstantiated hype with perhaps a modicum of anti-Semitic underpinnings. However, that would not be the entire truth. The CIC is a well organized and well-funded lobby. It has been able to court influential individuals into defending the Jewish state (Taras 1984:18). Yet, as has been demonstrated, Canadian foreign policy has been largely self-serving and not always responsive to the "Jewish Lobby." However, the success of lobby groups representing a constituency of approximately 1.4% of the entire Canadian population (Taras and Weinfeld 1990:666) does attest to the lobbies' strength. More difficult to dismiss is the 1987 poll of DEA bureaucrats who ranked the "Jewish Lobby" as having the highest influence in the formation of Canada's Middle-East policy.

This could be attributed to a general feeling in the DEA that Canada's foreign policy should be more sympathetic to Arab causes. In other words, since the policy is not as sympathetic as the DEA would like it to be, they conclude that the "Jewish Lobby" is to blame. Moreover, the DEA is not the final decision-maker and may not fully understand the factors that eventually determine the policy outcome. While a more satisfying answer is hard to reach, an oddity in the poll, namely that the Prime Minister and the cabinet rank second-and-fifth respectively in their influence on Canada's Middle-East policy, might somewhat discredit the whole survey. In an executive driven parliamentary system, it is curious that anyone, particularly bureaucrats who are well versed in government procedures, could conceive of the Prime Minister and the cabinet as not holding the top two decision-making positions. This paper has demonstrated that Canada's Middle-East foreign policy has generally reflected the government of Canada's own interests, rather than the sectarian goals of ethnic interest groups, particularly those of Jewish-Canadian communities. Canada's early policies attempted to reinforce the relationships among great Western powers, while its later policies reflected a will toward economic gains, largely through bilateral relationships. While Jewish, Arab, and business groups all lobbied, Canada's national interest won out. Whether or not this is positive or negative is a normative question and depends entirely on one's vantage point.

Footnotes

1 In Canada, the Jewish community is recognized both by itself and the community at large as a distinct ethnic and religious group (Taras and Weinfeld 1990:665). While this paper could use the terms "religioethnic," "ethno-religious," or other words to describe the Jewish community in Canada, it will rely on "ethnic," which is the term most commonly preferred in the literature. Additionally, the use of this term allows for greater

inclusiveness in the context of Middle-East foreign policy because the Arab community can be considered as one ethnic group, but not one religious group. However, problems with the term, "ethnic group," present themselves when dealing with the American Jewish community, who are generally more assimilated than their Canadian counterparts thereby somewhat losing their distinct ethnic identity while retaining religious differentiation (Taras and Weinfeld 1990).

2 Canada's Jewish community is better organized and takes politics more seriously than other ethnic groups (Riddell-Dixon 1985:46; Taras and Weinfeld 1990:670). The primary organizations in its lobby are the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Zionist Federation and the fraternal organization B'nai Brith Canada. In 1967, as a response to the perceived unpreparedness of Canada's Jewish community to lobby for Israel, these groups created the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC), which remains the foremost pro-Israel lobby in Canada until today. However, various Jewish lobbies have presented themselves over the years. The United Zionist Council was founded in 1941, transformed into the Zionist Organization of Canada, and eventually reconstituted as the Canadian Zionist Federation in 1967 (Taras 1989:44-50). Canada's Jewish lobbies have taken a strategy of behind the scenes lobbying, favouring quiet diplomacy over publicity seeking. The CIC does not threaten MPs regarding the effect of their actions on Jewish voting; rather, MPs are led to draw their own conclusions. While only six seats have over ten percent Jewish voters, Canada's Jewish community votes in numbers exceeding the national average. While it is likely that few Canadian Jews swing their votes based on Middle-East issues, the "Jewish vote" remains on the mind of political strategists, leaders, and candidates (Taras 1989:52; Lyon 1992-1993:8-15).

3 Canada's Middle-East foreign policy from 1945 to the present has grappled with issues that are not mentioned in this paper. Most notably this includes peacekeeping in Cyprus, both Gulf Wars, and the war in Afghanistan. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these issues. Moreover, this paper focuses only on those issues having a direct impact on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Certainly, the landing of Iraqi Scud Missiles in Tel-Aviv during the first Gulf War had a direct impact on Israel; however, Canada's reasons for involvement in the war were far removed from anything to do with Israel or the "Jewish Lobby" (Ismael 1994; Sucharov 2003).

4 "The secondary boycott is an attempt by Arab states, firms and individuals to pressure firms of other countries (namely Canada) to refrain from dealing with Israel or to end certain relationships with Israel, as a condition of trade with Arab states, firms, or individuals. This in effect compels a Canadian boycott of a country with whom Canada has friendly relations and against whom Canada has not itself authorized a boycott" (Stanislowski 1977:1).

5 "The tertiary boycott is an attempt to prevent firms or other countries (namely Canada) from dealing with firms of their own or other non-involved countries because of the latter firm's relationship with Israel, as a condition of doing business with Arab states, firms, or individuals" (Stanislowski 1977:1).

6. Interestingly, Canada's need to support the U.N. while helping to maintain healthy relations among states overshadowed three domestic and one foreign concerns that would tend to favour an anti-partition stance. Domestically, **Elizabeth MacCallum**, the Department of External Affairs Middle-East expert, was unabashedly pro-Arab, the Canadian public was increasingly anti-Israel due to terrorist attacks perpetrated in Palestine by Jews and a quiet anti-Semitic attitude existed among many Canadians. With respect to the foreign concern, the British government had an interest in maintaining good relations with the Arab states (Bercusson 1984:12; Kay 1978:123).

7. The "Jewish Lobby" at this time consisted of the Zionist Organization of Canada, the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canada Palestine Committee. This last group was comprised entirely of non-Jewish Zionists (Taras 1989).

8. The Jewish Agency was established by the World Zionist Organization following World War One to represent the Jewish community in Palestine to the British. The Hagannah was its military wing (Jewish Agency-American Section 1964).

9 Other Canadian domestic groups not dedicated to Jewish/Zionist issues also favoured partition. Primarily these groups were the UN Association and organized labour (Kay 1978:124).

10 Canada's businesses did not begin their involvement in Middle-East affairs until the anti-boycott legislation debate. While their economic interests certainly fell under the "national interest" heading, they did not make the connection between the recognition of a non-state actor and major business contracts (Goldberg 1989:108-110).

11 Many of these groups came together to form CAPLOT, or Canadians Against PLO terrorism. Among those organizations that publicly opposed having PLO delegates at the Crime Conference were the Law Society of Upper Canada, provincial and federal Liberal caucuses, Premier of Ontario, Chairman of Metro Toronto, International Association of Police Chiefs, Toronto Police Commission, Canadian Airline Pilots' Association, Hotelier's Association, and all federal and provincial opposition parties (Miller 1991:28; Stein 1976-1977:285). There was also a generally high anti-PLO sentiment in Canada at that time. Following **PLO leader Yassir Arafat's** appearance before the UNGA in November 1974, the Canadian media was overwhelmingly negative in its coverage of his organization (Ismael 1994:29).

12 **"Jewish Lobby"** responsible for having the government postpone the conference, thereby effectively denying the PLO admission into Canada. However, several other vocal groups opposed the PLO's presence in Canada, arguing that Canada's laws and opposition to terrorism prohibited the entrance of PLO members (Stein 1976-1977:285). Additionally important is that Canada had not yet recognized the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people (Ismael 1994:52).

It follows, then, that Canada would have no reason to want PLO representatives at the conference. Furthermore, analysts argued that Canada's failure to recognize the PLO would not impede improved relations with the Arab world (Stein 1976-1977:282).

Notwithstanding the last few points, in the case of the U.N. Crime Conference, it can be reasonably argued that the "Jewish Lobby" had some effect. However, whatever power the "Jewish Lobby" had did not last for long. Despite their prolonged efforts to have Canada enact anti-boycott legislation, the CIC completely failed. The Arab-Canadian community was fairly silent on the issue, but very satisfied with the government's inaction. Furthermore, the Canadian business community, a new player in foreign policy lobbying, had fought hard and won against anti-boycott legislation that could negatively impact the newly discovered "Arab market."

¹³ The

12 However, its effect was not strong enough to bar PLO representatives from the U.N. Habitat Conference held in Vancouver eight months after the Crime Conference was scheduled to take place in Toronto (Goldberg 1989:108-109).

13 The following corporation and business associations were concerned about Arab threats of economic retaliation: Bell Canada, the Canadian Manufacturer's Association, the Canadian Export Association, the 13 DEA's interpretation mirrored that of the business community (Goldberg 1989:110-112; Stanislowski 1989:69). Under the rubric of Trudeauvian foreign policy doctrine, Canadian industries could legitimately claim that their economic welfare was beneficial to the national interest (Stanislowski 1989:63-64).

14 A source within the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce claimed that moving the embassy would cost Canada \$1 billion in business and 55 700 jobs (Flicker 2002-2003:133).

15 One of the reasons for the differing opinions on the Lebanon War between the Jewish community and the DEA was that while the Jewish community viewed it as a conflict between Israel and a terrorist state, the DEA tended to understand it as a conflict between two equal peoples (Miller 1991:62).

16 Presumably, one could argue that the map is from before 1921, when the first partition of Palestine into trans-Jordan and cis-Jordan took place. However, the book was published in 1994 and deals with a time period beginning in 1945.